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2023

D 13 June 2023   

2019

March 2019: Turkey’s Reactions to the Terror Attack in New Zealand
On the March 15, 2019, 50 people have been killed at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. This is indeed one of the most (...)

  • March 2019: Turkey’s Reactions to the Terror Attack in New Zealand

On the March 15, 2019, 50 people have been killed at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. This is indeed one of the most tragic issues of 2019. It also shows the global level of the increasing ethno-religious oriented tensions among the radical individuals and groups. Right after this tragic issue, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has condemned the terrorist attacks on mosques. He saw this issue as one of the sad examples of rising racism and Islamophobia. He also noted that, “With this attack, hostility towards Islam, that the world has been idly watching and even encouraging for some time, has gone beyond individual harassment to reach the level of mass killing… It is clear that the understanding represented by the killer that also targets our country, our people and myself, has started to take over Western societies like a cancer…” Likewise, Turkish president, the head of the Turkey’s presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanlığı), Ali Erbaş, has noted that this attack is one of the examples of the rising intolerance of the Muslims among the non-Muslim majority countries. Beyond these official declarations, some of the Sunni Muslim communities in Turkey reacted to the attacks from their social media accounts.

D 19 March 2019    AAhmet Erdi Öztürk

2018

January 2018: Historic Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Istanbul reopens doors to prayers after seven years of restoration
On the 7th of January, the leaders of two neighbouring countries, Turkey (...)

  • January 2018: Historic Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Istanbul reopens doors to prayers after seven years of restoration

On the 7th of January, the leaders of two neighbouring countries, Turkey and Bulgaria, reopened the Bulgarian St. Stephen’s Church in İstanbul after seven years of restoration. This church has a unique cast iron structure. Re-opening the Church for use is a remarkable turning point, politically speaking, since this would mark the opening of doors for the non-Muslim minority’s and their rights in Turkey.

Since 2002, Turkey has witnessed consecutive single-party governments under the AKP (Justice and Development Party-Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which has a pro-Islamic (Sunni) leadership cadre. Initially advancing a pro-democratic agenda, the AKP has since 2010 taken a clear authoritarian turn, instrumentalising a both nationalist and pro-Islamist rhetoric to mobilize support and smother opposition. The new policy preference has influenced the state identity and bureaucracy, and the decision makers have, therefore, started to act without abiding by the rights of non-Muslims in Turkey. Furthermore, these pro-Sunni policy preferences have started to weaken the Turkish understanding of secularism. For instance; Sumantra Bose, a professor of International and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, has recently claimed that the “Turkish secular state is dead.” Emphasizing the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) hegemonic Hanafi-Sunni majority policies, he notes that “Kemal’s [modern Turkey’s founding father, credited for secularizing the country] secular state is literally no more than a memory.”

There are some clear indications that the Turkish understanding of secularism might be in danger and that the state does not respect the non-Muslim groups anymore. For example, the budget of the Sunni Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs-Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) has quadrupled under the AKP rule. Diyanet now issues fatwa (religious rulings) on demand and wades into political issues, often backing up the AKP’s pro-Sunni ideology. Turkey’s national school curriculum has been rewritten, leaving out evolution but adding the concept of “jihad”. The number of students enrolled at religious schools, officially known as imam hatip, has risen from 60,000 to more than 1.2 million since 2002. Furthermore, the biggest mosque in modern Turkey is currently being built on a Çamlıca hill overlooking İstanbul. It will be seen from everywhere in Istanbul, President Erdoğan declared. It is just one of the hundreds that have gone up in recent years across the country, where there is almost no new pro-policies and/or positive attempts to provide places of worship for non-Muslims.

However, as noted previously, in this pro-Sunni atmosphere, the re-opening of the Bulgarian Orthodox church and messages of the Turkish leaders were surprisingly positive. In other words, the sentences of the leaders were full of religious tolerance and optimism about the future of the non-Muslims of Turkey.

For instance; Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım noted that, the “reopening of the church represents an example of the tolerant atmosphere in Turkey.”

Following the speech of Yıldırım, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan highlighted that, “an opening like this carries a significant message for the international audience on my behalf. Istanbul has once again shown the world that it is a city where different religions and cultures exist in peace.” And he added that, “Turkey has supported the restoration of more than 5,000 artefacts in the past 15 years.”

At last, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov declared that, “It is the responsibility of the state to ensure everyone can worship freely,” and added that “efforts to “normalize” relations between Turkey and the EU in 2018 were needed. At this point, it should be noted that Bulgaria has taken over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on Jan. 1, and has, therefore, become an important actor for the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU.

For further details, see France 24.

D 15 January 2018    AAhmet Erdi Öztürk

2017

June 2017: Prof. Dr. Ali Erbaş is appointed as the new President of Diyanet
On June 31 2017, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez, a Turkish cleric who headed the Directorate of Religious Affairs (...)

  • June 2017: Prof. Dr. Ali Erbaş is appointed as the new President of Diyanet

On June 31 2017, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez, a Turkish cleric who headed the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a government department that runs more than 85,000 mosques, bid farewell to his post he had occupied since 2010. After Görmez, Prof. Dr. Ali Erbaş was appointed as the new head of the Diyanet. Prof. Erbaş has been serving as rector of Yalova University.

For details please see website tdv.org

  • March 2017: President of Diyanet Görmez spoke at 9th Ambassador’s Conference for the second time

The implementation by Turkey of laiklik (read as "secularism") had one big output: the setting up of the presidency of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet). The Diyanet is an administrative unit required by law to maintain the secular structure of the State, and is, nevertheless, principally charged with the management of religion, particularly the regulation of Islamic (which means here Sunni Muslim) faith and practice, religious education, and the construction and maintenance of places of prayer. Furthermore, Turkey’s Diyanet has been playing a multidimensional and active role in other countries for more than 30 years. This year, for the second time, President of the Diyanet Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez addressed the ambassadors at the 9th Conference of Ambassadors. Despite the fact that his presentation was dealing with recent developments in the Muslim World and the Western World, Görmez mentionned two critical issues. The first one was regarding to the struggles of strategy with the so-called Islamic State and other (alledgedly) faith-based terrorist organisations. The other one is directly related to Turkey’s domestic policy problem: the conflict between the AKP and the Gülen Movement.

It should be noted that while Prof. Görmez was addressing the terrorist organisations, he claimed that "the term ’jihad’, which actually means working and showing effort in the name of Allah, and includes all kinds of efforts of the true believers of Islam, was made into a “modern war doctrine.” Such affirmations causes the loss of opportunities to promote, introduce and explain Islam as a religion of love, peace, compassion, and justice. Muslims and Islam become a source of fear in other places, especially in the Western world, due to the fanatical violent cycle of such movements."

Source: speech of Prof. Mehmet Görmez.

D 7 November 2017    AAhmet Erdi Öztürk

2016

October 2016: Diyanet’s report on terrorism
Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) is a secular administrative unit which was established in 1924, before the implementation of (...)

  • October 2016: Diyanet’s report on terrorism

Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) is a secular administrative unit which was established in 1924, before the implementation of the secularism code in 1937. In the Constitution of 1924, the Religion of the Turkish State is Islam. This mention was removed from the Constitution in 1928. In 1937, the principle of Laiklik (secularism) is added to the Constitution. The task of the Diyanet is to execute services regarding the Islamic faith and its practices, to enlighten the society about religion, and to carry out the management of places of prayer. Since 1983, it also has the duty to provide religious services for Turks living abroad through the DITIB (Diyanet Isleri türk Islam Birligi – Religious Affairs of the Turkish Islamic Union). Although the Diyanet’s assigned position is religion-related, its structural and legal mechanisms are secular, and it has recently gained an increasingly political position, especially during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period.

Furthermore, the Diyanet has given itself a new position, in line with the ruling party’s discourses and actions. In this regard, while the world is suffering the terror activities of DAESH/ISIS, the Diyanet has just published a report – at the time Turkey is involved in cross-border operation with international coalition forces to oppose terrorist forces – about its mentality, activities and relation with Islam. Additionally, according to the Diyanet, one of the goals of this report is to contribute to the awareness-raising process.

The report highlights four important points:

1) The report explains the ideology and mind-set of the terrorist organisation, from the perspective of Turkey’s religion administrative office.
2) The report examines the Islamic understanding of the organization called DAESH/ISIS and their approach of religious texts, and provides information regarding its formation processes.
3) The report gives an explanatory answer to the claim of DAESH/ISIS to be the Caliphate of Islam.
4) The report categorises different groups that have been prosecuted by DAESH/ISIS, such as Ahl-Al-Kitab (people of the Book, i.e. Christians or Jews), Yazidis, women and children.

Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
  • September 2016: The management of religion in Turkey

There is an ongoing debate in Turkey nowadays concerning both secularism and the Diyanet (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, directorate of religious affairs). Two articles can help to understand the background of these discussions, by highlighting the importance of the Diyanet and explaining the Turkish understanding of secularism.

Firstly, a report on The Management of Religion in Turkey, issued by the Turkey Institute in 2014, describes the relationship between religion and politics in a Muslim-majority country. This relationship has wider implications for the neighbouring region, due to the fact that Turkey has a secular state structure and a mostly Muslim population. In addition, the implications for minorities, control of religion by the State, and freedom of religion or belief, have great significance not only for academic research and discussion but also for day-to-day political decision-making. This analysis is highly relevant to the recent developments in Turkey, currently governed by the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which uses religious rhetoric, and appeals to the public with and through religious sensitivity. Last but not least, the management of religion in Turkey also has an impact on Turkey’s democracy, human rights, equality and good governance. In that sense, it will be closely monitored by the European Union, as stated in its recently published progress report on Turkey.

An article of Murat Somer, from Koç University, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey", can also be of interest although having been published in 2007. Developing an argument based in theories of democratic consolidation and religious competition, and discussing the reasons for the secularist opposition to the government, this article analyses how government by a party rooted in moderate Islamism may affect Turkey’s peculiar secular democracy, development and external relations and how Muslims in the world relate to modernization and democracy.

Source: Istar Gozaydın and Ahmet Erdi Ozturk, The Management of Religion in Turkey, Turkey Institute, November 2014;
Murat Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey", Third World Quarterly Vol. 28, No. 7, 2007, p. 1271–1289.

Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
  • July 2016: the attempted coup d’état and the religious question

On the evening of 15 July 2016, Turkey was the scene of an attempted military coup, which was ultimately aborted. In Turkey’s contemporary history, the military has seized state power four times, directly in 1960 and 1980, and indirectly, by imposing an administration under orders, in 1971 and 1997. As such, the July 2016 attempt is in line with the country’s political “tradition” where the army has always been the most important political force. As in previous military coups, here too the “religious” was, and still is, at the heart of the debate.
On the very night of the attempted putsch, the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and especially its undisputed leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, pointed the finger at their former ally, the Hizmet movement, and its founder, Fethullah Gülen, who has been in exile in the US since 1999.
The Hizmet movement was created by this former Turkish imam in the late 1970s in Izmir, based on the teachings of Said-i Nursi. Since the 1990s, the Hizmet movement (which means “service”) has made its way into two key sectors of society — the media and education — in Turkey but also around the world. It is often compared to the Jesuits (or Opus Dei by its detractors). The movement’s sympathisers, from modest backgrounds, educated in Hizmet schools thanks to scholarships and the support of the financial empire formed by the movement, were able to penetrate the state apparatus from the 1990s. They received help and support from various governments, but their meteoric rise coincided with the coming to power of the Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 2002. In the early 2000s, the AKP was severely lacking in the educated people needed to conquer the State apparatus, then largely secular and under military control. For a decade, the AKP government, on the one hand, and the Hizmet movement on the other collaborated to format civil servants in all ministries, including the army through the Ergenekon trials in years 2007-2011. The coalition was shattered once the AKP succeeded in gaining control of all areas of power. In 2013, corruption scandals, revealed by wiretaps on police officers accused of being close to Hizmet, deepened the divide and, since then, a reverse purge has begun. From the justice system to education, the universities, the media, banks, etc.: in every sector, public or private, a witch hunt began.
Since the attempted coup, it has grown to phenomenal proportions. Some blame it on Gulenist officers (followers of Fethullah Gülen), who, according to the press under strict government control, had fomented the coup for fear of being ousted from the army. Others see it as a manipulation of power, while still others detect in it an unnatural coalition between Gulenists and secularists to oust Erdogan from power.
Whatever the case, this coup attempt created an atmosphere that was concurrently ultra-religious (for 48 hours, mosques called loudly for prayer) and ultranationalist (giant rallies were held, with the participation of the Kemalist-Nationalist Party and the far right, which feared it would otherwise be associated with the putschists).
Since that time, the purge of the State and the private sector has continued at top speed. Nearly 200,000 civil servants have been stripped of their status. Hundreds of schools and universities have been closed, and dozens of newspapers and television channels banned. It is a putsch, instrumentalised by the government to complete the transformation of a regime into an ultra-presidential system where all the powers were grouped into the hands of the President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Since 15 July, the slightest criticism or opposition is immediately accused of putschism and/or Gulenism. The only ones not to be included in this Turkish-style “National Front” was the party close to the Kurds and the democrats, reduced to a trickle, and caught between the hammer (a military junta coupled with an esoteric brotherhood) and the anvil (an Islamist and nationalist authoritarian regime).

Samim Akgönül
  • 25 April 2016: The Turkish Parliament Speaker calls for a religious constitution

On 25 April 2016, Ismail Kahraman, the speaker of the Turkish Parliament, pleaded for the removal of the principle of secularism in the constitutional reform called for by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Kahraman deems that Turkey’s next constitution must be religious as it is a Muslim country.
This controversial claim has sparked many reactions. Protests against the risk of a religious constitution have broken out in the country’s major cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir), and were violently repressed by the police. The opposition parties (CHP, HDP) called for the resignation of the Parliament Speaker.
However, the draft of the new constitution maintains the idea of secularism, and the AKP has not even raised the possibility of removing it, said the head of the constitutional committee and AKP MP Mustafa Sentop on 26 April.
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu assured on 27 April that the new Turkish constitution would maintain the secular character of the State.

Sources : Habertürk, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, France 24.

Nihal Durmaz
  • January 2016: Turkish civil servants’ schedules adjusted for Friday prayers

The Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced on Tuesday, January 5, at a meeting of the parliamentary group of his Justice and Development Party (AKP), his intention to publish a decree that would adjust lunch break times for civil servants so desiring, in order to practise Friday prayer without encroaching on working time.

Source : Le petit journal-Istanbul.

Nihal Durmaz

D 1 September 2016    AAhmet Erdi Öztürk ANihal Durmaz ASamim Akgönül

2015

December 2015: Alevis on hunger strike in a protest against military operations in Southern Turkey
To put an end to the curfew and continuing operations in Eastern and Southern Turkey, Alevi (...)

  • December 2015: Alevis on hunger strike in a protest against military operations in Southern Turkey

To put an end to the curfew and continuing operations in Eastern and Southern Turkey, Alevi organisations located in several regions of Turkey launched a hunger strike on 29 December 2015. This movement has taken on an indefinite nature and many Alevi and civil society organisations have joined the ongoing initiative.
Various trade union or voluntary organisations are supporting the movement (DİSK, KESK, TMMOB, Kent Konseyleri, HDP, EMEP, İHD).

Sources: Evrensel and Cumhuriyet.

  • May 2015: Legalisation of religious marriage in Turkey

On 30 May 2015, Turkey’s Constitutional Court repealed a law which banned celebrating religious marriage before civil marriage. This law, aimed at the outset at protecting women, was regarded as contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The ban, dated back to 1936, was aimed at preventing forced marriages, the marriage of minors and abuses in regions where archaism and the patriarchate dominate. The law also aimed at protecting women’s rights and those of their children who, outside of civil marriage, cannot benefit from inheritances, alimony and other aid which couples united by civil marriage receive. But, by 12 votes against 4, the judges considered that this provision contravened equality before the law, religious freedom and respect for privacy. They highlighted the fact that the legislation did not envisage any sanction for free union, contrary to religious marriage, and identified this as discriminatory.
Associations defending women’s rights fear that this new decision may facilitate forced marriage, the marriage of very young girls and insecurity for women.

Sources: Laïcité-Revue de presse and Le Petit Journal-Istanbul.

D 31 December 2015    ANihal Durmaz

2014

October 2014: Introduction of Christian theology lessons into school curricula in Turkey
The teaching of religion in schools has always been a thorny issue in Turkey, in particular for the (...)

  • October 2014: Introduction of Christian theology lessons into school curricula in Turkey

The teaching of religion in schools has always been a thorny issue in Turkey, in particular for the Alevi community, a heterodox branch of Islam. Complaints have been raised by Alevi Turkish nationals about the content of compulsory lessons in religion and morality in schools, which are based on the Sunni understanding of Islam. Subsequently, in September 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced its decision, declaring that the Turkish education system is not yet able to ensure respect for the various convictions and that Turkey must reform its teaching programmes for religious education in schools.
The Turkish government criticised the verdict by expressing the need for teaching moral values to prevent religious information which could be harmful and incorrect. In early October 2014, the Turkish Minister for National Education declared that the teaching of Christian theology would be included in school curricula for pupils from Christian backgrounds. He also announced the preparation of a religious education curriculum by Jewish citizens.

Source: Daily Sabah.

  • 22 September 2014: the wearing of the veil is henceforth authorised in high schools in Turkey

Following the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 22 September 2014 in Ankara, Government spokesman and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arinç announced that regulations on banned and permitted clothing had been modified. According to Arinç’s explanation, the term “uncovered head” present in paragraph “e” of Article 4 of the regulations, as well as in the last sentence of this same paragraph, had been repealed.
This change is presented as a measure intended to widen personal freedoms, but it became the target of sharp criticism. The secular opposition considered that it is an act aimed at reinforcing Islamisation of the country, highlighting that the freedoms are broadened only in one domain.

For more information, see Le Nouvel Observateur.

  • 16 September 2014: the ECHR invites Turkey to reform the compulsory teaching of religion in the Turkish education system

Following the implementation of compulsory lessons in religion in Turkey, 14 Turkish citizens of Alevi confession had asked in 2005 for the programme of teaching of religious culture and morality to be revised by taking into account Alevi culture and philosophy. Faced with the lack of an answer from the Ministry for Education, they turned to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2011, considering that the content of compulsory courses in religious and moral culture gave precedence to the Sunni approach to Islam.
On 16 September 2014 the ECHR announced its decision, calling upon Turkey to reform the teaching of religion in schools. Recalling that the Turkish education system ought to keep its neutrality and impartiality on religious issues in order to guarantee respect for the various convictions, the ECHR condemned Turkey for violating the right to education. The Court considered that Turkey should quickly put in place suitable means to rectify this situation, by introducing an exemption system to make these lessons non-compulsory.
Following the ECHR decision, Turkey’s Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that the ECHR decision would be examined by the Turkish executive, pointing out the importance of teaching a suitable religious culture. The decision will be final within three months, if in the meantime no party requires its re-examination by the Grand Chamber of the Court.

For further information: Le Nouvel Observateur, Radikal (in Turkish).

  • The movement of Muslim anti-capitalists in Turkey: a new type of religious action against the political powers

In recent years, the appearance of a new politico-religious force has become apparent in the public arena in Turkey. It is the movement of anti-capitalist Muslims, whose doctrine stems from a cross between Marxist ideology and the Qur’an. Their participation in many social initiatives, such as the Gezi movement on 1 May 2013, testifies to a re-appropriation of left-wing discourse by anti-capitalist Muslims. In addition, the participation of activists coming from various left-wing persuasions in the ceremony of “breaking the fast” (yeryüzü sofrasi, iftar), organised by the anti-capitalist Muslims, testifies to the success and breadth of this movement.
In an article entitled “Belonging to Islam without appearing Muslim: the Alevis’ dilemma in Turkey” (Orient XXI, 23 January 2014, in French), Samim Akgönül puts forward an analysis of this movement of political Islam: "Since political Islam has been in power and especially since the emergence of a generation of urban intellectual Muslims, political Islam has lost its monolithic character. It comprises several opposing tendencies. One of the more surprising examples of this multiplicity of facets of politicised Islam is the emergence of a group of young Muslims who violently oppose the party in power - the Party for Justice and Development (AKP), principal representative of political Islam in Turkey. These anti-capitalist Muslims blame the Islamist powers for being more capitalist… than Islamist. […]
Turkish anti-capitalist Muslims are often young people from popular areas, politicised at university, familiar with Marxist ideas, but who continue to define themselves as Muslims. Reconciling a resolute Marxist affiliation and a convinced Muslim one takes place via a certain number of Islamic principles understood to be the foundations for a united, social, socialist, and above all anti-capitalist stance. This group does not only oppose the capitalism of the AKP, it has many points in common with other political movements on the socialist and/or liberal left. […]".

D 12 November 2014    ANihal Durmaz

2013

November 2013: major meeting of Alevis in Kadiköy
Turkish Alevis organised a major meeting in Istanbul on 3 November 2013 to protest against the “democratic package” announced by the Turkish (...)

  • November 2013: major meeting of Alevis in Kadiköy

Turkish Alevis organised a major meeting in Istanbul on 3 November 2013 to protest against the “democratic package” announced by the Turkish Government in September 2013. After the visit by the President of the Republic, Mr Abdullah Gül, to a cemevi (place of Alevi worship) in Tunceli in July 2013, a visit which marks a step forward in Turkish internal politics, almost 200,000 Alevis gathered in Istanbul in the Kadiköy district to ask the Government for equality of all citizens with respect to religious rights and a real recognition of their belief.

Source: Le petit journal

  • September 2013: “democratic package” adopted by the Turkish Government

On 30 September 2013, Prime Minister Mr Tayyip Erdogan announced a “democratic package” relating to freedoms and rights for minorities.

Some points concerning minorities:

a. It will be possible to choose between different languages and dialects for the language of instruction in private schools, some subjects will however continue to be taught in Turkish.
b. The Mor Gabriel Monastery, located near the town of Midyat in the Turkish province of Mardin, will be handed back to the Orthodox Syrians. Since 2009, the monastery was in conflict with the Turkish State.
c. The Grand Orthodox Seminary of Heybeliada Island, Halki in Greek, will not be reopened. The Halki Institute of Orthodox Theology is a higher education institution dedicated to the theological training of the Orthodox clergy and is located on the island of Heybeli in the Marmara Sea near Istanbul. It depends on the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Founded in 1844, it was closed by Turkish authorities in 1971. Among the many points of discussion, its reopening is considered important for Turkey joining the European Union.
d. Towns and villages whose names underwent Turkification after 1980 can reuse their original names. Tunceli will thus revert to being Dersim. This process was already underway. The letters Q, X and W, which exist in Kurdish but not in Turkish, can henceforth be used.
e. Electoral propaganda will be allowed in languages other than Turkish. When writing and at public meetings, political leaders may also use languages other than Turkish. The Constitutional Court had already ordered the Government to respect this right in 2011.
f. There has been no progress regarding the status of the cemevi - the Alevi places of worship - which are still not recognised, thereby remaining problematic for this community.
g. The Government has guaranteed the creation of an institute of Roma languages and cultures.

Source: Liberation, L’Express, Le petit journal.

  • September 2013: first baptisms for a century in the Church of Akdamar, Van

For the first time in a century, Turkish Armenians celebrated baptisms in the Church of Akdamar Island in Van, a town in the East of the country. Six people, including one baby, were baptised in the waters of Lake Van after a religious ceremony in the Holy Cross Church of Akdamar Island (Akhtamar in Armenian), a building dating from the tenth century and restored between 2005 and 2007 by the Turkish authorities. Mr Aram Atessian, the acting leader of the Armenian Patriarchate, presided over the religious ceremony.

  • April 2013: developing interfaith relations in Turkey

Developments in various domains - religious buildings, assistance for refugees, cultural policies, law or social movements - bear witness to the evolution of interfaith relations.

 Restoration of the Church of Surp Giragos: the largest Armenian church in the Middle East, located in Diyarbakir, has reopened for prayers after a long period of restoration in November 2012. The new campanile, built in Moscow, weighs 150 kilos. With the participation at the ceremony of Aram Atesyan, Archbishop of the Patriarchate of Turkish Armenians, the church is once more open for prayer.

 In April 2013 the Turkish Government announced its strategy for Syriac refugees or other ethnic and religious groups fleeing the civil war that has been taking place since 2011 in Syria. The Government has planned to build two camps in Midyat intended to receive 10,000 people in total; the first near the Mor Abraham Monastery (4,000 refugees), and the second close to Treasury lands. The first camp will welcome Syriacs and Catholics, the second Kurds and Muslims. The Government is thereby putting in place humanitarian assistance, in cooperation with the Turkish Red Crescent. The budget announced by the Government for this humanitarian aid is approximately 10 million Turkish Lira.

The famous Turkish pianist Fazil Say had been accused of “insulting religion” in October 2012 for having tweeted a message citing a quatrain from the famous Persian poet Omar Khayyam making fun of carnal pleasures promised in the afterlife. Judgement was pronounced on 15 April 2013 and the pianist was sentenced to ten months in prison. This decision was changed by the legal bodies into five years under police supervision. If Fazil Say commits no offence during these five years, the sentence will be annulled. Say simply said: “I am sad for my country” during his brief statement to the Turkish press.

On 24 April 2013, several Turkish journalists and writers published a declaration concerning the events of 1915 in the French newspaper Libération. The title of the declaration is: “We are all Armenians on 24 April”. Its signatories include Ayşe Günaysu, Ahmet İnsel, Halil Berktay, Ferda Keskin, Ferhat Kentel, Şenol Karakaş, Sait Çetinoğlu, Ümit Efe, İsmail Beşikçi, Roni Margulies, Lale Mansur, Erdal Doğan, Yasemin Göksu, Ergin Cinmen and Ragıp Zarakolu.

  • March 2013: conflict over religious buildings - new developments concerning Mor Gabriel Monastery

The Mor Gabriel Orthodox Monastery, founded in 397 by Mor Samuel and Mor Simon of Qartmin, is located near the town of Midyat in the province of Mardin in Turkey. Since 2009, the monastery has been in conflict with the Turkish State. Kuryakos Ergün, President of the Foundation of the Mor Gabriel Monastery, says everything is clear politically as regards the ownership of the monastery, but the administrative will to solve the problem is lacking. After discussions with Mr Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ergün stated in March 2013 that the Government is aware of the issue of the ownership of the monastery, but the matter has long been in the hands of legal bodies. There is therefore nothing else to do than to await the legal decision.

Source: Le petit journal

D 5 December 2013   

2012

December 2012: publication of the first book in Syriac by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism
The first book in Syriac published in December 2012 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the (...)

  • December 2012: publication of the first book in Syriac by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism

The first book in Syriac published in December 2012 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey contains a major amount of Syriac literature and most of the poems by Mor Afram, the famous Syriac poet. The 400-page book, entitled “The chalumeau of the Holy Spirit”, was translated by Gabriel Akyüz, Priest at the Syriac Church of Mardin.

  • October 2012: The Fazil Say case

In October 2012, the famous Turkish pianist Fazil Say was charged with "insulting religion" for having tweeted a message citing a quatrain by the famous Persian poet Omar Khayyam mocking carnal pleasures promised in the afterlife. "The state, which allows itself to judge a pianist for a simple tweet, is headed by a Prime Minister who was himself condemned in his time for reading a poem", said the Turkish pianist. In 1997, Erdogan had indeed been sentenced for publicly reading a poem considered to be Islamic (see on line).

  • October 2012: The theological school on the island of Heybeli

The theological school of Heybeli Island (Halki) was founded in 1844 and has been closed since the 1970s. The school library contains a treasure of 80,000 philosophical, literary and religious works in ancient Greek or Latin. There was some discussion about reopening the Halki theological school (Orthodox) by attaching it to a new department - “Culture of the world’s religions” - linked to the Faculty of Theology at the University of Istanbul. But because the department’s Director, Zekeriya Beyaz, is a Muslim theologian, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul did not favour the idea and this department has also been closed since October 2012.

  • September 2012: Attack in Sürgü

It all took place in Sürgü, a village in Malatya, Turkey, during Ramadan. Alevis do not celebrate Ramadan, so when the 4am drum announced it was time for sahur, they did not wake up, as their Sunni neighbours did, to begin fasting. A dispute then ensued between an Alevi family and the person responsible for waking up the neighbourhood.
The day following the dispute, some 50 villagers turned up and threw stones at the windows of the house, singing the Turkish national anthem. Shots were fired, according to the family. The protest lasted two hours, during which all the other Alevi families were waiting for the police to intervene. The next day, the AKP mayor of Dogansehir, the sub-prefect and several ministers from the AKP and CHP, including Huseyin Aygün, CHP’s minister from Tunceli, travelled to the area to try to calm spirits.

  • September 2012: The problem of cemevis

A few weeks after the events in Malatya, one of the CHP ministers, Mr. Hüseyin Aygün, asked parliament to open a cemevi (place of prayer for Alevis) wherever there is a mosque. The President of the Assembly, Mr. Cemil Çiçek, replied that Alevism was a branch of Islam and that the mosque was also the place of worship for Alevis.

  • August 2012: The church of Surp Kevork

The Armenian church of Surp Kevork, located in Mardin in Turkey, has long been used by the Ministry of Agriculture as a warehouse for medicines. In 2004, the church guardian was found guilty of destroying the building, after having dug down about seven metres into the earth in search of treasure there. Subsequently, the church was put under state protection.
Since 2007, the Armenian population has been awaiting the restoration of the church, but no progress has been made. The church has been in ruins for so long that only four walls and one foundation survive. As a result of its lack of interest in arranging restoration work, the Department of Agriculture re-assigned the church to the Catholic Armenian Foundation of Mardin in August 2012. The Armenian population hopes that this transfer will enable some progress to be made towards restoring the church.

  • June 2012: modification to the “Religious Culture and Moral Education course”

It is frequently stated that 99% of Turks are Muslims, without specifying which interpretation of Islam is concerned. Yet, a significant part of these are Alevis who in the main do not want to be assimilated with Sunnis.

Discrimination towards Alevis has long remained absent from public debate. For several years now, discussions have been taking place between Alevi representatives and the government to examine the Alevis’ requests. There are many of them, but they mainly concern having the same rights as Sunnis in two respects: religious studies in state schools and the subsidies granted by the Diyanet (the Turkish department for religious affairs). The Diyanet is responsible for remunerating thousands of imams (approximately 59,617 in Turkey and 1,525 abroad, in addition to 22,000 officials occupying positions other than as imams within the Diyanet in 2010). However, the Diyanet does not subsidise Alevi religious authorities, the “dedes”.

Opinions are very much divided among Alevis as to how to remedy these inequalities. Some advocate pure and simply abolition of the Diyanet and compulsory religious studies - considered to be pro-Sunni. Mainly these are secular groups who are reticent about the Turkish State intervening in the religious sphere. Others have expressed the desire to receive from the Diyanet the same services as Sunnis. The state would thus subsidise remuneration of the “dedes” and construction of places of worship (although the Diyanet almost never subsidises mosques, whose construction is funded through donations from believers).

As regards the “religious culture and moral education course” and its compulsory nature (stipulated by Article 24 of the Constitution introduced by the military regime in 1982), several solutions have been put forward: removal of the mandatory nature of this course, the total removal of the course from state school curricula or even adapting the curriculum to make it, as its name suggests, a “religious culture and moral education course”, i.e. neutral and not pro-Sunni.

After long debates about the issue of the “religious culture and moral education course” and the ECHR’s decision of 9 October 2007 (Hasan and Eylem Zengin c. Turkey), the current government opted for the third solution and, in the new 2012-13 curriculum, granted a place to Alevism that it considers proportional to the needs of Alevi populations. Up to now, Alevism was fleetingly mentioned among “the esoteric interpretations of Islam”. In the new curriculum, Alevism is now introduced in many chapters presenting its beliefs, faith, its ethics and history.

There are then numerous additions to the curriculum. For example, the explanation of fasting in the month of muharram; the importance of Ali (son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet) and Ahlu al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet); the presentation of the key figures of Alevism (Ahmed Yesevi, Haci bektas Veli and Ali al-Riza). Nevruz (the traditional festival celebrated by Iranian, Kurdish and Turkish peoples) will be dealt with in the unit devoted to important Islamic days with the aim of “sharing our woes and our happiness”. Alevism is to be mentioned in the course on “interpretations of Islam”, as well as in that on “the Islamisation of Turks”. Alevi practices such as “cem” and “semah” (cem is a religious ritual consisting of twelve services, one of which is semah, which designates a sacred dance composed of bodily movements of a mystical nature) or Alevi calligraphy or principles (“musahip” (brother of the afterlife) and “Dört Kapı Kırk Makam”, four doors, forty steps, which detail the stages of progress in the faith) will be also explained.

Arif Gümus

  • February 2012: Debate on education reform

The Ministry of National Education has passed a reform extending the duration of compulsory education from 8 to 12 years. Opponents have criticized the segmentation of these twelve years into three cycles (naming this provision ’4+4+4’).

Prior to this reform, pupils in primary and secondary education in Turkey had received at least eight years’ schooling; from the age of six years, they spent eight years in compulsory, continuous education. The government has increased this period to 12 years. Nobody opposes the duration of compulsory education, but controversy surrounds the segmentation of the twelve years into three cycles of four years each.

The first criticism made by the parliamentary opposition and many NGOs of the 4+4+4 formula relates to children who are obliged to start primary school at the age of 5 years. The former law provided for children aged 72 months (6 years) to start primary school, but the new reform lowers this limit of 72 months to 60 months. This means that children aged 60 months (5 years) who fulfil certain educational criteria should start school, even if their parents do not accept this, with the only way around the law being payment of a sum of money.

The other criticism focuses on the authorisation to reopen so-called Imam Hatip schools from elementary level. The new law provides that, at the end of the first cycle of four years, when the child has therefore reached the age of ten, he/she might be steered towards a branch of vocational education, notably Imam Hatip schools. These schools for educating imams turned themselves into ordinary schools a long time ago and are prized by conservative families.

Under the new law, children who have not chosen an Imam Hatip school now have the possibility of choosing three optional courses in religion at school, entitled ’The Qur’an’, ’The life of Mohammed’ and ’Main religious knowledge’. With these mandatory lessons in religion, a child from the age of 11 who does not go to an Imam Hatip school has the option of taking four courses in religion, equivalent to 8 hours of religious instruction in total.

Source : Le petit journal.

D 20 December 2012    AArif Gümus

2009

October 2009: Resumption of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey
Through the intermediary of Switzerland, on 10th October 2009, Armenian and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs (...)

  • October 2009: Resumption of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey

Through the intermediary of Switzerland, on 10th October 2009, Armenian and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed two protocols in Zurich (Switzerland) in the presence of foreign ministers of the countries of the MINSK Group (United States, Russia and France).
These agreements provide for "the establishment of diplomatic relations" and "the development of bilateral ties" between the two countries. Besides the content, the signing of these agreements represents the first step towards a dialogue between two countries that have had no formal relations for over fifteen years, i.e. since the occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh province by Armenia in 1993. The protocols address two issues still unresolved to this day that are undermining relations between the two neighbours. They concern, on the one hand, the reopening of their common border closed by Turkey in 1993 and, on the other hand, a joint commission of history and research to be created in order to uncover the truth surrounding the events of 1915, qualified as genocide by the Armenians.
What is more, the signing has taken place between two states where nationalism is still rife. The Armenian diaspora, fiercely opposed to this reconciliation, has significant power in both countries; Azerbaijan is also opposed to this reconciliation and accuses Turkey of abandoning it.
Today, debates rage. Both protocols must still be submitted to Turkish and Armenian national assemblies for ratification in the near future. The political goodwill of the two states involved does not preclude, however, difficulties relating to these agreements, including the strong opposition of Azerbaijan to the opening of the border: it will continue to refuse this possibility so long as it does not regain control of the territories currently under Armenian administration.
This reconciliation between Armenians and Turks began with the efforts of Hrant Dink, journalist and left-wing Armenian-Turkish intellectual, who was assassinated in January 2007 by still unclear nationalist groups. The taboo on the Armenian issue is now lifted in Turkey where intellectuals, press and public are debating the genocide issue.

D 19 November 2009    AInan Sevinç

2008

November 2008: Recognition of Alevism
Since the beginning of September 2008, one of the main issues which has been troubling Turkish society is whether or not to recognise Alevism as a (...)

  • November 2008: Recognition of Alevism

Since the beginning of September 2008, one of the main issues which has been troubling Turkish society is whether or not to recognise Alevism as a religion in the country. Alevis complain that Turkish secularity is coercive and only takes into account the Sunni aspect, as much in obligatory classes on religion as in the context of the Administration of Religious Affairs. On 11th November 2008, more than 10 000 protesters marched through the streets of Ankara to demand the abolition of religion classes or of the Administration of Religious Affairs. However, Alevis are also divided between those seeking to be integrated into the system of existing religions and those who purely and simply demand the abolition of this system. The AKP government is showing signs of openness towards integrating Alevism into this system, in particular by proposing to make Alevi religious dignitaries state officials.

  • July 2008: Trial of AKP

On 14th March 2008, State Prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, filed a lawsuit against AKP accusing it of being "a hotbed of anti-secular activities" and "seeking to transform the country into an Islamic state". He asked for the party to be banned and for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and 70 of his main colleagues, including President Abdullah Gül, to be excluded from politics for five years.
The Prosecutor stated that the AKP is the successor of the previous Turkish Islamic parties, which, according to him, direct their political struggle against "republican values" and more particularly against secularity. "The AKP is founded by a group that has learned its lessons from the previous ban of Islamic parties and is using democracy to achieve its goal of establishing Sharia law in Turkey", said the indictment.
The indictment of 162 pages cites several incidents to prove the Islamic motives of the AKP. He also criticised the new director of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), a body that supervises Turkish universities, for having supported the constitutional amendments proposed by the government to limit the ban on students wearing the Islamic veil at university.
The decision was made on 30th July 2008. It is clearly a decision respecting a fragile political balance as much as legal considerations, since the Constitutional Court did not ban the AKP, but gave it a serious warning by imposing a financial penalty (loss of half of its public funding). As a result, Conservatives may consider themselves "winners", as the AKP continues to govern without provoking early elections and leading the country into a political crisis, but the laity also believes that this compromise decision confirms their fears about the anti-secular character of power.

  • February 2008: The Islamic headscarf in universities

On Saturday 2nd February in Ankara, tens of thousands of protesters denounced a government proposal to lift the ban on Islamic headscarves in universities. The issue of secularity and the meaning and application of this concept have always been a major concern in Turkish political life, especially since the rise of political Islam in the mid-1960s with the Millî Görüs movement. The AKP political group (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Party of Justice and Development), arose from this movement and came to power in 2002; the offices of the President of the Republic and of executives of public administration are occupied by people close to this movement. Since then, the issue of the secular future of the country has become red hot and is crystallising around two key issues affecting young people: that of Islamic headscarves in universities and that of the status of schools for imams and preachers.
The AKP and the MHP (Party for the Nationalist Movement) have agreed to some constitutional changes that open the doors of universities to girls wearing the Islamic headscarf, banned up until now (or tolerated in some universities). The secular opposition sees this as a way to undermine the secular, modern, Western foundations of Turkish society on the pretext of "human rights and freedom of belief." Opposition groups, largely from the urban, neo-kemalist ’left’ do not fear nearly as much the presence of "turban-wearers" on university benches as the moment when this generation will integrate political, social and public life, extending their conservative, religious vision and their own particular understanding of "modernity" to the entire public sphere. Tens of thousands of people marched on 2nd February 2008 to the mausoleum of Atatürk, the father of secular, coercive Turkey, led by the CHP (the Republican People’s Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal himself), which intends to take the matter to the Constitutional Court. They hope that the latter will oppose it, considering it an attack on the principle of secularity etched in stone, like the articles of the Constitution, "immutable and to which it is forbidden to propose changes".
However, since 2002 (and especially since July 2007), senior legal and administrative figures increasingly include either people close to the AKP or liberals who believe that the Kemalist dogma must change (which is the case for the President of the Constitutional Court or the President of the Institution of Higher Education - YÖK), even if state officials and legal staff remain loyal to the Kemalist dogma. The legal (Constitutional Court) or administrative (YÖK) opposition could then be insufficient to stem the intrusion of religion into the public arena.
Despite opposition protests, the Turkish Parliament in fact adopted this amendment to the Constitution on Thursday, 7th February with 404 votes in favour to 92 against, which was far more than the two thirds of votes required (367).

D 9 December 2008    ASamim Akgönül

2007

October 2007: The issue of secularism
Following the legislative and presidential elections which confirmed the political supremacy of the AKP (the party in power obtained 47% of the votes and (...)

  • October 2007: The issue of secularism

Following the legislative and presidential elections which confirmed the political supremacy of the AKP (the party in power obtained 47% of the votes and its candidate Abdullah Gül was elected President of the Republic), the debates around the issue of secularism intensified once more. The opposition parties, i.e. Kemalists and militaries accuse the AKP of weakening the secular pillars of the Turkish society, a very particular interpretation of secularism characterized by the control of religion by the State. According to the AKP, secularism goes with the free practice of religion including the wearing of religious signs in public places, i.e. the Islamic veil. Following the creation of the new Government, the power in place started to write a new "civil" Constitution. The current Constitution is the result of the military takeover of 1980 with some modifications. In the new Constitution, in which religion is absent, the coercive secularism is less tough, although the text remains unmodified.

  • Religion lessons in secondary schools

The debates are also centred around the compulsory teaching of religion in secondary schools. These lessons, which are presented to all Muslim students (non-Muslims being exempted from such lessons) are strongly oriented and are exclusively based on the Hanefist version of Muslism sunnism. However, the Alevi fringe of the population (heterodox Islam derived from Chiism but close to popular Anatolian beliefs) increasingly shows its disapproval towards this obligation. The recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights which has ruled in favour of an Alevi plaintiff (decision of 9 October 2007) contributed to accelerate the search for a solution. One of the solutions would be to divide religion lessons into "religion" and "ethics" lessons.

D 27 November 2007    ASamim Akgönül

2006

December 2006: Alevis’ claim and the neutrality of the State of Turkey
Since December, religious debates in Turkey mainly revolve around the Alevis. They have become the subject of intense (...)

  • December 2006: Alevis’ claim and the neutrality of the State of Turkey

Since December, religious debates in Turkey mainly revolve around the Alevis. They have become the subject of intense debates regarding the official running of religion as they are proponents of a heterodox Islam bearing syncretic elements.
The Directorate of Religious Affairs is exclusively run by the Sunnites and since the beginning of negotiations with the EU, some people advocate for the Alevis to be taken into account, given the necessary neutrality of the State.
Recently, two progressive results have been achieved in this regard. As far as mandatory religious courses are concerned, a large number of Alevis argue that they mainly promote the Sunnite culture and in this regard, they claim exception. For the first time, the Vice- President of the Association of the Alevis-Becktachis, Ali Kenanoglu obtained a legal right for his son not to attend these courses (see the Turkish daily newspapers of 26/11/2006). Since then, other requests have been made. The matter is still under examination at the ECHR.
In order to neutralise these complaints and abide by the European demands, the Turkish government decided to integrate Alevism in the syllabus of mandatory courses. In the same time, the Directorate of Religious Affairs decided to publish 17 fundamental books of Alevism. This decision angered some Alevis who remain distrustful of the State intervention. The Alevis are indeed divided in the question regarding relations with the State.

  • November 2006: The papal visit in Turkey: an interest for all interlocutors

The visit of Pope Bernard XVI in Turkey was given a lot of publicity. Between 28th November 2006 and 1st December 2006, he visited Istanbul, Ankara and Ephesus.
According to many observers, this visit was a success for the Vatican. Unlike his predecessor, Pope Bernard XVI, indeed shows a higher interest in ecumenism than in Muslims-Christians dialogue. Thus, the main purpose of the visit was to attempt reconciliation with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. In this sense, the visit was beneficial as Pope Bernard XVI and Bartholomew I held similar positions and celebrated the mass together.
It is evident that after the declaration of Ratisbon, the papal visit in Turkey took a different meaning. Also in this case, the Pope’s attitude of reconciliation which went as far as praying in the Mosque of Sultan Ahmed, and the reception by the Turkish Authorities (the Prime Minister and the Minister of Religious Affairs) improved the image of the Pope in the Muslim world.
Finally, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate also gained from the visit. This shows that it has both a spiritual role in the Christian world and a political role at the international level to play. Even though the Turkish authorities would like to confine it to a status of a local Church, its responsibilities go far beyond this level.

D 29 December 2006    ASamim Akgönül

2005

November 2005: Decision of the European Court of Human Rights
On 10 November 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its final judgement in the case of "Leyla (...)

  • November 2005: Decision of the European Court of Human Rights

On 10 November 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its final judgement in the case of "Leyla Sahin versus Turkey". Leyla Sahin is a young Turkish national of 22 years who wears the Islamic headscarf. Her complaint against Turkey was based on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights which concerns freedom of religion. Miss Sahin was unable to continue her studies at the Medical faculty of the University following a circular refusing students with beards and those wearing the Islamic headscarf access to class. The Grand Chamber rejected the complaint, noting that this interference in Miss Sahin’s exercise of her right to manifest her religion was founded on the principles of secularism and equality.
This judgement sparked raging debate in Turkish political and social circles. In fact, the current political power held by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (an offshoot of the bigger Islamic political movement the Millî Görüş, but which has since distanced itself from them), launched a campaign for the lifting of the ban on the Islamic headscarf in Universities. And so, maybe for the first time in the history of the ECHR, a Government was looking forward to its own sentence, hoping that it could be used afterwards as indisputable reference in the abrogation of the ban on the Islamic headscarf. The day after the judgement was published, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused the ECHR of not having consulted with experts in Islamic law on the issue whereas this was regularly done for issues bordering on Christianity. This mention of the authority of the "ulemas" immediately sparked furious reactions from Turkish secular circles. They accused the Government of digressing from the principle of secularism enschrined in Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution - one of the articles not open to modification. Since then the Prime Minister has softened his tone, while he has maintained the idea that this judgement would not prevent future changes to the law.

See the judgement of 10 November 2005

  • Increasing debates on religious matters

The November 2002 elections ended up with the delegation of the "National Vision" movement (Millî Görüş, founded by Necmettin Erbakan in the 1960s) gaining power for the first time. Consequently, religious debates became hotter than ever. The leaders of AK, the ruling party, distanced themselves from this historical movement of political Islam. They presented themselves as "democrat Muslims" like democrat Christians in western countries. The Turkish intelligentsia, the military and the proponents of the reforms advanced by Mustafa Kamel accuse them of dissimulating their real objectives and claim not to believe their revolutionary discourse.
Intense debates revolve around the role of the army in politics (perceived by the supporters of Kamel’s reforms as a guarantee for secularism), forbidding the Islamic headscarf in primary, secondary schools and in higher education, schools of Imams and preachers (Imam hatip okullari) and their role in public education.

D 25 November 2005    ASamim Akgönül

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